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In Lebanon, diverse sociopolitical projects have sought to mend the wounds, repair
the cracks, and overhaul the loss of the devastating civil war (1975–90). Experts and
technopolitics have featured centrally in almost all of them. In my anthropological
research on expertise on peace and crisis in Lebanon, I explore how, in the decades after
the war, an abstract ideal of peace gave way to a distinct space occupied by diverse
groups of experts. I analyze how a previously political aim was transformed into a
professionalized field around which specialized knowledge domains were developed and
technopolitical practices deployed. In this essay I briefly explore this new architecture
of expert power based on the technopolitics of peace (and war) in the contemporary
Middle East.
“Summer Camp Repairs Rifts after Nahr al-Bared Crisis,” reads a headline in
Lebanon’s English-language Daily Star on 1 August 2008.1 In the five-day summer
school, funded by the governments of Italy and Spain and jointly organized by the
UN Development Program (UNDP), the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies, and the
Lebanese Palestinian Dialogue Committee, “young people from Lebanese and Pales-
tinian communities were isolated in the mountains and encouraged to open a dialogue.”
According to the organizers, the goal—to ease tensions between Palestinian residents of
the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp and Lebanese living near the camp—was achieved. In-
deed, a UNDP official from Spain declared: “In five days they’ve been able to overcome
these prejudices.” The workshop, we are told, mended the wounds that the “crisis of
Nahr al-Bared” had produced. Both the school and the reporting on it reflect a growing
tendency among peacemakers to understand eruptions of political violence as temporary
crises that can be addressed by the wide application of workshops in which citizens can
“resolve” the crisis with the help of training from specialists.
This story is paradigmatic of the role that the conflict resolution workshop increasingly
plays in efforts to define the problem with violence and design a response. A five-day-
long workshop is described as a “successful” measure to “repair the rifts” of a series of
events that featured the Lebanese National Army laying siege to and shelling a refugee
camp of thirty thousand souls almost daily for four months. As a response to the crisis,
Lebanese and Palestinians were “isolated” in the mountains. (It is remarkable, if not
cynical, to suggest that for Palestinians, who have spent most of their lives in refugee
camps, the best place to “overcome their prejudices” is yet another camp, even a “summer
camp.”) In my work I analyze the conflict resolution workshop as an assemblage of
particular technomoral arrangements aimed at organizing (and disciplining) through
sequestration the ways that bodies behave, move, and express feelings and opinions.
available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020743814001093
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 07:28:25, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,
788 Int. J. Middle East Stud. 46 (2014)
That is not all. Secluding bodies within a spatial arrangement that is distant from
familiar environments is only one element of the disciplinary logic. The next move is to
introduce the technical and the moral care of the self.2
This takes us beyond the rhetoric of repair of wounds, to the underlying assumptions
about the constitution of the individuals in these workshops and the society at large.
Arguably, the image that guides such interventions is one of a morally handicapped
society finding itself in a generalized state of civil disintegration, indeed an uncivil
society. Hence the (re)production of a professionalized field of peace experts, whose
degree of legitimacy and institutional existence depends on their ability to master the
binary between an intrinsically ignorant and potentially uncivil society (which needs to
be trained) and themselves as experts (who need to train it).
A few weeks after the car-bomb assassination of Imad Mughniyeh, a top Hizbullah
military commander, a panel discussion entitled “The Mughniyeh Assassination and
the Hizbullah scholarship” was hosted by a Beirut-based think tank, with offices in
London and Washington, D.C., and an Arabic news translation agency in one of Beirut’s
luxury hotels. During the Q&A, audience members questioned the label “Hizbullah
scholarship” and the logic behind the event. They protested the carving out of a separate
domain of expertise solely focused on this particular party, thus insinuating it as a gray
zone between academia, journalism, and intelligence services.
Despite resistance to the term, “Hizbullah scholarship” continues to grow, especially
after the party’s successful military campaign against Israel’s occupation of southern
Lebanon (1978–2000). During my fieldwork, books, articles, and reports about Hizbullah
had begun proliferating exponentially. However, there is no consensus among researchers
about how to label the party. The list ranges from the most dismissive to the most sup-
portive. Most researchers prefer what they consider the middle-of-the-road category of
the “non-state actor.” While this term means different things to different people,3 it is
hard to escape its normative undertones. Non-state actors are defined solely according
to their antithetical position vis-a`-vis the state. As a concept, “non-state actor” is ab-
stract enough to include a variety of heterogeneous political formations and normative
enough to signify an antithesis to the state, a negative marker opposed to the unmarked
prototype.
In the context of Hizbullah scholarship, the use of the term is almost always nor-
mative, punctuated with presumptions of disloyalty. Among experts on civil society
and governance, however, the antithesis to the state implied by similar terms is norma-
tively positive. Thus, the “non-governmental organization” is perceived as the favorable
counterpoint to a corrupt and undemocratic state. This discursive practice advanced by
peace and development experts is often organized with the help of technopolitical ar-
rangements, such as specialized documents and public events, like the aforementioned
one. In my work, I show how “technonormatives”—the peculiar type of technopolitical
practice that disseminates normative labels—is based on Eurocentric, statist, and cultur-
alist ideas and informs contemporary peace and development expertise in Lebanon and
elsewhere.4
On 25 January 2008, a car bomb exploded in Beirut, killing Lebanese army captain
Wisam Eid, the official investigator of a series of assassinations of politicians, includ-
ing former MP Rafiq al-Hariri. In the CrisisWatch report produced by the International
Crisis Group (ICG), a figurative “bomb” appeared to signal the explosiveness of the
available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020743814001093
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 07:28:25, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,
Roundtable 789
situation.5 For ICG experts, the crisis report is a major tool for resolving conflicts
around the globe. I suggest looking at the crisis report as a technopolitical tool that
disseminates knowledge about crisis around the world, packaged in a universal format.
I analyze the report as an assemblage of technical characteristics that help to shrink the
world into the master format of the crisis expert, resembling the literary figures in tales
by Jonathan Swift, Rabelais, and Lewis Carroll. Crisis reports combine analysis and
recommendations, constituting both early warning micromechanisms and pocket-sized
tools of crisis management. Each crisis report must master these two interrelated tasks.
In Lebanon, this practice often blurs the already shaky boundary between knowledge
for peacemaking and intelligence for state-led counterinsurgency operations, especially
in the context of ongoing military conflict between Israel and Hizbullah. Crisis experts
shake off the suspicion of partisanship by integrating the “data” into broader systems of
alert-and-response that appear to represent not particular states and institutions but the
universal desire for peacemaking and crisis resolution. Presupposed within the mech-
anism of the sentinel, they are masterfully diffused within the seemingly nonpartisan
mechanism of crisis warning.
I argue that this technopolitics of crisis distributes and organizes spaces and subjec-
tivities along the classic Greek use of the term that meant simultaneously “objective
crisis” and “subjective critique/decision.”6 In the space of crisis, recalcitrant entities are
placed under overt or covert forms of surveillance on the grounds of universal values
and mechanisms. In the space of decision the observer’s subjectivity is produced as
part of a quasi-scientific system of alert-and-response to international threats, which
increasingly resemble natural disasters. This new technopolitical ontology is successful
because through it crisis bears a resemblance to a quasi-natural phenomenon. As such,
the technopolitics of crisis implies a crucial difference between the observed and the ob-
servers. While the observed are guided by particular interests and parochial worldviews,
and rooted in the old game of partisan politics, the observers—equipped with scientific
mechanisms of analysis and alert—follow universal values and procedures, thus always
already inhabiting a post-political world.7
Sequestration, scholarship, sentinel—the technopolitics of peace—are, I argue, part
and parcel of a new architecture of expert power. I call this new form of power Master
Peace for multiple reasons: it is produced by groups of experts who (claim tο) master
certain skills; it consolidates the authority of master rules over places, processes, and pop-
ulations; it constructs master subjectivities divided into trainers and trainees, observers
and observed, political and post-political; it deploys master devices and mechanisms
in any context; it allows the technicians of peace to use scale, shrinking large political
issues down to a peace camp, a crisis report, an academic label, thus enabling a crisis
expert, a peace NGO, a specialized researcher to master peace, by altering the relative
size of themselves and their objects; finally, it constitutes a globalized master form of
post-politics from which further copies can be (un)made.8
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